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I.

Introduction

Although the People’s Republic of China (PRC or China) has entered into well
over 110 bilateral investment treaties (“BITs”), therefore ranking second only to Germany
on a global scale,1 her investment treaty practice has so far only drawn little attention in
international legal scholarship and the international business community. While
extensive literature exists on the legal aspects of investing in the PRC,2 accounts of the
regime established by international investment treaties, which grant protection to foreign
investors under international law in China, are scarce.3 This stands in sharp contrast to
the analysis of the influence of China’s accession to the World Trade Organization
(WTO),4 although the regime established by international investment treaties is bound to

1

UNCTAD, Recent Developments in International Investment Agreements,
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite_dir/docs/webiteiit20051_en.pdf.

2

This literature is mainly concerned with commercial aspects of investing in the PRC, such as the intricacies of the
domestic legal system for foreign investment, practical aspects of structuring an investment project in China and the
influence of domestic reforms on the overall investment climate. See MICHAEL, MOSER (ed.), Foreign Trade,
Investment, and the Law of the People’s Republic of China (1987); GUIGUO WANG, China’s Investment Laws – New
Directions (1988); WEI JIA, Chinese Foreign Investment Laws and Policies: Evolution and Transformation (1994); ROBERT
STRANGE/JIM SLATER/LIMIN WANG (eds.), Trade and Investment in China: The European Experience (1998); JUN FU,
Institutions and Investments: Foreign Direct Investment in China during an Era of Reform (2001); W. B. GAMBLE, Investing
in China: Legal, Financial and Regulatory Risk (2002).

3

See for older accounts of BIT practice of the PRC HANS-MARTIN BURKHARDT, Das deutsch-chinesische
Investitionsschutzabkommen, 30 Recht der Internationalen Wirtschaft 28 (1984); LI SHISHI, Bilateral Investment
Promotion and Protection Agreements: Practice of the People's Republic of China, in: DE WAART/PETERS/DENTERS (eds.),
International Law and Development, p. 163 (1988); LAWRENCE W. BATES, Protecting Foreign Investments in China: the
Sino-Japanese Bilateral Treaty: Comparison with Earlier BITs and U.S. Positions, 10 E. Asian Executive Rep. 9 (1988); T.
NAKAJIMA, Agreement between Japan and the People's Republic of China concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal
Protection of Investment, 33 Jap. Ann. Int’l L. 228 (1990); JOHN S. MO, Some Aspects of the Australia-China Investment

p.

4

(2005);

available

at:

Protection Treaty, 25 J. World Trade L. 43 (1991); QINGJIANG KONG, Bilateral Investment Treaties: The Chinese

Approach and Practice, 8 Asian Yb. Int’l L. 105 (1998/1999). See for more recent accounts WENSHUA SHAN,
The Legal Framework of EU-China Investment Relations – A Critical Appraisal (2005) (focussing on aspects of bilateral
investment treaties between the PRC and EU-member States); STEPHAN SCHILL, Der Schutz ausländischer
Investitionen in den Investitionsschutzabkommen der VR China, in: MICHAEL RANFT/CHRISTOPH SCHEWE (eds.),
Chinesisches Wirtschaftsrecht, pp. 75-88 (2006); CAI CONGYAN, Outward Foreign Direct Investment Protection and the
Effectiveness of Chinese BIT Practice, 7 J. World Inv. & Trade 621 (2006).
4

See, for example, DONALD C. CLARKE, China’s Legal System and the WTO: Prospects for Compliance, 2 Wash. U.
Global Stud. L. Rev. 97 (2003); LINDSAY WILSON, Investors Beware: The WTO Will Not Cure All Ills with China, 2003
Colum. Bus. L. Rev 1007 (2003); KAREN HALVERSON, China's WTO accession: economic, legal, and political
implications, 27 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 319 (2004); VERON MEI-YING HUNG, China’s WTO Commitment on
Independent Judicial Review: Impact on Legal and Political Reform, 52 Am. J. Comp. L. 77 (2004); HUNG-GAY
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have a comparably profound impact on business and investment relations with the PRC.
The regime’s implications should also not be underestimated in terms of their potential for
change of China’s domestic legal system and its economic constitution.
Having been traditionally critical towards the protection of foreign investment by
international law, a new development took place starting in the late 1990’s when the PRC
entered into a number of new generation BITs that broke with her long-standing
reservations vis-à-vis national treatment for foreign investors and comprehensive investorState dispute settlement.5 This change is prominently marked by the conclusion of BITs
with the Netherlands in 20016 and Germany in 20037 that conform, despite some
remaining limitations, in all major aspects to what can be considered standard treaty
practice in well over 2400 BITs worldwide.8 China’s change in BIT practice can,
however, not only be observed in relation to traditional capital-exporting countries, but
also features in recent BITs with developing countries across the globe. China’s new
generation BITs now offer more effective protection against political risks stemming from
undue government interference with the business activity of foreign investors. These
changes, it is submitted, constitute a fundamental change in the country’s foreign
economic policy.
After giving an account of China’s ideological struggle with the protection of
foreign investments by international law (Part II), the paper analyzes the PRC’s new
FUNG/CHANGHONG PEI/KEVIN H. ZHANG (eds.), China and the Challenge of Economic Globalization: The Impact of
WTO Membership (2006); V. LO/X. TIAN. Law and Investment in China: The Legal and Business Environment after
China's WTO Accession (2005); Henry GAO/DONALD LEWIS (eds.), China s Participation in the WTO (2005); T. L.
WALMSLEY ET AL., Assessing the Impact of China’s WTO Accession on Investment, GTAP Working Paper Series (2003);
D. SMITH (ed.), China and the WTO (2002); A. YUAN, China's Entry into the WTO: Impact on China's Regulating
Regime of Foreign Direct Investment, 35 Int’l Law. 195 (2001).
5

See for the specifics of the old generation Chinese investment treaties compared to international standards SHISHI
(supra footnote 3), p. 163, 167 et seq. (1988).

6

Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments between the Government of the People’s
Republic of China and the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, signed Nov. 26, 2001, entered in force
Aug. 1, 2004 [all investment treaties cited are available in UNCTAD’S online database of international investment
instruments at http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/DocSearch____779.aspx.

7

Agreement between the People’s Republic of China and the Federal Republic of Germany on the Encouragement
and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, signed on Dec. 1, 2003. The treaty entered into force on November 11,
2005, see German Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology, Neues deutsch-chinesisches Investitionsförderungsund
-schutzabkommen
in
Kraft
getreten,
press
release
of
Jan.
12,
2006,
available
at
http://www.bmwi.de/BMWi/Navigation/Presse/pressemitteilungen,did=100772.html; see also International
Institute for Sustainable Development, Investment Treaty News (ITN), Feb. 17, 2006, available at
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2006/itn_feb17_2006.pdf.
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See UNCTAD (supra footnote 1), pp. 1 et seq. (2005).

2

generation investment treaty practice (Part III). In describing the substantive investor’s
rights granted, the paper shows in particular how the recent treaty practice breaks with
former limitations in the country’s old generation BITs and transforms them into effective
and powerful tools of investment protection. This results from two major innovations of
the new generation treaties: the country’s acceptance of comprehensive investor-State
dispute settlement and the inclusion of national treatment. Part IV concludes by
suggesting that China’s recent BIT practice can be understood as an important indicator
for the evaluation of international investment law by a developing country in the struggle
about the appropriate level of investment protection in international economic relations.

II.

The PRC’s Changing Attitude towards International Investment
Protection

Until 1979, the relationship of the PRC towards foreign investment and its
protection by international law has been one of resentment and scepticism.9 Similar to
the Great Wall built in an attempt to protect various dynasties from raids by foreign
powers between the 3rd century BC and the beginning of the 17th century,10 the PRC
isolated itself from the international community and shielded itself against foreign
economic and political influences by setting up ideological fortifications against foreign
investors and their protection by international law.11 In line with its Marxist ideology,
notions and concepts of private property and individual economic initiative were
vigorously rejected and the phenomenon of foreign investment gradually effaced through
confiscation and intricate forms of creeping expropriations without compensation after the
communist revolution in 1949.12

9

KONG (supra footnote 3), 8 Asian Yb. Int’l L. 105, 107 et seq. (1998/1999). See on the attitude of the PRC
towards international law during this era COHEN/CHIU, People’s Republic of China and International Law (1974);
SHAO-CHIUM LENG (ed.), Law in Chinese Foreign Policy: Communist China and Selected Problems of International Law
(1972).

10

On the history of the Great Wall see ARTHUR WALDRON, The Great Wall of China: From History to Myth (1990).

11

See on the development of the protection of foreign investment by international law RUDOLF DOLZER, Eigentum,
Enteignung und Entschädigung im geltenden Völkerrecht, 1985, p. 13 et seq.; ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, International
Economic Law, p. 391 et seq. (2002).

12

PAT K. CHEW, Political Risk and U.S. Investment in China: Chimera of Protection and Predictability?, 34 Virg. J. Int’l L.
615, 623 et seq. (1994) (describing the strategies of the Chinese government to terminate existing foreign investment
in the 1950’s by “retaliatory confiscation” and “hostage capitalism”).

3

In its foreign policy, the PRC also aligned itself with the broader movement by
developing countries to establish a “New International Economic Order” that emphasized
the sovereignty of States over their natural resources and denied any substantial protection
of foreign investment under international law.13 Similar to principles put forward by Latin
American States under the Calvo Doctrine,14 China’s foreign policy was characterized by
the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, consisting of “mutual respect for each other’s
sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each
other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence”.15 With
respect to foreign investment these principles translated into the position that
“(1) States have the sovereign right to control the entry of FDI and to
regulate the activities of foreign investors in their territory;
(2) [t]he right to nationalise foreign property is an inherent attribute of
national territorial sovereignty, and the exercise of this fundamental right is
not subject to any pre-condition such as ‘public purpose, due process and
compensation’, and
(3) State contracts or concessions are to be observed, subject to the sovereign
power of host countries to mandate re-negotiation, revision or even
unilateral modification on the basis of changed circumstances or public
interest”.16
Yet, after 30 years of self-imposed isolation, China’s attitude towards foreign direct
investment radically changed in 1979. The country became eager to attract foreign
investment in order to boost its economic, social and technological progress and
announced its “open-door policy”. Correspondingly, its foreign policy was altered and
henceforth enshrined in “ ‘three guiding principles’ of international economic cooperation and exchange, i. e. the principles of sovereignty, equality and mutual benefit,

13

See KONG (supra footnote 3), 8 Asian Yb. Int’l L. 105, 109 (1998/1999). More generally on the politics

and economics connected with the New International Economic Order see JAGDISH N. BHAGWATI, The
New International Economic Order: The North-South Debate (1978); JEFFREY A. HART, The New International Economic
Order: Conflict and Cooperation in North-South Economic Relations, 1974-77 (1983); see also THOMAS W. WAELDE, A
Requiem for the “New International Economic Order”, in: HAFNER/LOIBL (eds.), Liber Amicorum: Professor Ignaz SeidlHohenveldern, p. 771 et seq. (1998).
14

On the Calvo Doctrine and its ideological backdrop more generally, see SHEA, The Calvo Clause – A Problem of InterAmerican and International Law and Diplomacy (1955); OSCHMANN, Calvo-Doktrin und Calvo-Klauseln (1993); ZAGEL,
Auslandsinvestitionen in Lateinamerika, pp. 71 et seq. (1999); LIPSTEIN, The Place of the Calvo-Clause in International Law,
22 Brit. Ybk. Int’l L. 139 (1945).

15

Kong (supra footnote 3), 8 Asian Yb. Int’l L. 105, 109 (1998/1999).

16

Id.

4

and reference to international practice”.17 While these principles may appear as a simple
prolongation of the earlier policy, the reference to international practice already illustrated
the PRC’s willingness to engage with the habits of the international community and to pay
greater respect to international standards developed for the protection of foreign
investment.18
Attracting foreign investment to the PRC became a full success. Since 1979, the
country has emerged as the world’s largest importer of foreign investment in the
developing world.19 Inflows of foreign direct investment in mainland China rose to over
US$ 60 billion in the year 2004, totalling to an aggregate foreign direct investment stock of
US$ 245 billion.20 The country’s size as a domestic market, the availability of cheap labor
and her rapid rates of economic growth account for her attractiveness as a destination for
foreign investment.21 Tax incentives further add to attracting foreign investors.22 In
addition, China’s accession to the WTO in December 2001 resulted in lowering trade
barriers and granted greater access for Chinese products to foreign markets and is, thus,
likely to incite further growth of export-oriented foreign direct investment. Furthermore,
the liberalization of the trade in services under the General Agreement on Trade in
Services (GATS) provides foreign investors with “greater opportunities for participation in

17

Ibid., at 110 et seq.

18

Ibid., at 111.

19

On the history of foreign investment in China, see OWEN D. NEE, JR., Shareholder Agreements and Joint Ventures in the
PRC, p. 3 et seq. (2005); see also on the devlopment of foreign investment in China YI LI, Legal and Financial
Framework of Promoting FDI in Capital-Importing and Capital-Exporting Countries - China, in: BRADLOW/ESCHER (eds.),
Legal Aspects of Foreign Direct Investment, p. 281, 282 et seq. (1999); S. L. SHIRK, How China Opened its Door: The
Political Success of the PRC's Foreign Trade and Investment Reforms (1994).

20

UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2005 (2006), Annex table B.1, p. 306 for data on FDI flows and Annex table B.2,
p. 310 for data on FDI stock, available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/wir2005_en.pdf. (figures excluding
Hong Kong and Macao).

21

See PAT K. CHEW, Political Risk and U.S. Investment in China: Chimera of Protection and Predictability?, 34 Virg. J. Int’l
L. 615, 621 (1994); see also YIGANG PAN, The Inflow of Foreign Direct Investment to China: The Impact of CountrySpecific Factors, 56 J. of Bus. Research 829, 833 (2003) (concluding that “a substantial proportion of the FDI in
China has been aimed at tapping China’s domestic market”). According to an UNCTAD survey, China is considered
to range as the most attractive global business location both among experts as well as transnational corporations;
see UNCTAD (supra footnote 20), p. 34 (2006).

22

ZHAODONG JIANG. China's Tax Preferences to Foreign Investment, 18 NW. J. Int’l. L & Bus 549 (1998); SAMUEL
TUNG/STELLA CHO, The Impact of Tax Incentives on Foreign Direct Investment in China, 9 J Int’l Accounting 105
(2000); MAUGUE, Tax Incentives in the People's Republic of China: Who Benefits, 5 Tulane J. Int’l & Comp.

L. 155 (1997).
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a wider sphere of commercial activities, such as banking, insurance, foreign trade,
transportation, tourism, telecommunications, accounting, and legal services”.23
At the same time, the PRC is emerging as an increasingly important exporter of
foreign investment, notably in Asia and Africa.24 Although her total outflow of foreign
direct investment into other developing countries only amounted to an estimated
aggregate of approx. US$ 39 billion in 2004,25 the PRC disposes of significant foreign
investment stakes abroad. For instance, China is reportedly the single most important
foreign investor in Sudan’s oil industry.26 Parallel to the increase in economic power, the
political weight of the PRC in the international arena will abound – and so will its
influence on international law.27 In the context of Sudan’s Darfur crisis, for example, her
major investment in the country is probably one of the crucial factors for China’s
hesitance in regard of a Security Council resolution against Sudan.28
Realizing the need of foreign investors for predictability and protection of their
investment, China’s reservations with regard to international law slowly crumbled. In
order to promote foreign investment inflows into China, as well as to protect investment
by Chinese companies abroad, the PRC has not only introduced a vast number of

23

K.X. LI/KEVIN CULLIVANE/CHENG JIN, The Application of WTO Rules in China and the Implications for Foreign Direct
Investment, 4 J. World Inv. 343, 360 (2003); see for influence of the WTO accession on China foreign investment
regime also ANYUAN YUAN, China's Entry into the WTO: Impact on China's Regulating Regime of Foreign Direct
Investment, 35 Int’l Law. 195 (2001); QINGJIANG KONG, Towards WTO Compliance – China’s Foreign Investment
Regime in Transition, 3 J. World. Inv. 859, 878 (2002).

24

See more generally on the PRC emerging role as a capital exporter KEVIN G. CAI, Outward Foreign Investment: A
Novel Dimension of China’s Integration into the Regional and Global Economy, 160 The China Quarterly No. 160, 856
(1999) (concluding that China’s outward foreign investment will “mak[e] the country even more completely and
irreversibly integrated into the global community”, at 880). See also CONGYAN (supra footnote 3), 7 J. World Inv.
& Trade 621, 631 et seq. (2006) (explaining the change in China’s BIT practice as a function of its desire to promote
and protect outward foreign direct investment).

25

UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2005, Annex table B.1, p. 310; FDI toward flows in 2004 were approx. US$ 1.8
million, see idib., par. 306.

26

See PETER S. GOODMAN, China Invests Heavily In Sudan's Oil Industry, Washington Post Foreign Service, December
23, 2004, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A21143-2004Dec22.html. More generally
on outbound foreign investment MITCHELL SILK/RICHARD MALISH, Are Chinese Companies Taking Over the World?, 7
Chic. J. Int’l L. 105 (2006).

27

See for the implications of China’s rise to a political and economic world power ERIC A. POSNER/JOHN YOO,
International Law and the Rise of China, 7 Chic. J. Int’l L. 1 (2006); RANDALL PEERENBOOM, The Fire-Breathing
Dragon and the Cute, Cuddly Panda: The Implications of China’s Rise for Developing Countries, Human Rights, and
Geopolitical Stability, 7 Chic. J. Int’l L. 17 (2006).

28

See STÉPHANIE GIRY, China's Africa Strategy – Out of Beijing, The New Republic Online, Oct. 11, 2004,

available at http://www.tnr.com/doc.mhtml?i=20041115&s=giry111504.
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domestic laws,29 she also started – parallel to the change in foreign policy – concluding
bilateral investment treaties soon after initiating its open door policy for foreign
investment. In 1982 the PRC signed its first BIT with Sweden.30 Subsequently surging to
well over 110,31 BITs are now in existence with almost all capital-exporting countries, like
Germany, Japan, France or the United Kingdom as well as with a large number of
developing and transition economies in Asia, Africa, Eastern Europe and South America.
Notably, there is however no bilateral investment treaty with the United States after initial
negotiations were terminated after the Tiananmen incident.32 Although the PRC, unlike
many developed countries, does not use a model template for its BIT negotiations,33 the
high number of treaties already concluded and the efforts to negotiate further such

29

See YI LI (supra footnote 19), p. 281, 288 et seq. (1999); QINGJIANG KONG, Foreign Direct Investment Regime in
China, Heidelberg J. of Int’l L 872 (1997).

30

Agreement on the Mutual Protection of Investments between the People’s Republic of China and the Kingdom of
Sweden, signed March 29, 1982.

31

As of June 2005 the country has concluded a total of 113 BITs of which 87 have entered into force. See the list of
BITs by country available under http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=2344&lang=1 search
term “China”.

32

CHEW (supra footnote 21), 34 Virg. J. Int’l L. 615, 660 et seq. (1994). See further on the proposed BIT between the
U.S. and China TIMOTHY A. STEINERT, If the BIT Fits: The Proposed Bilateral Investment Treaty Between the United
States and the People's Republic of China, 2 J. Chin. L. 359 (1988); ROGER W. SULLIVAN, Do We Really Need a BIT?, 15
China Bus. Rev., No. 6 at 9 (Nov.-Dec. 1988); MARK R. WEINER/SHAO YING, The Need for a Bilateral Investment
Treaty Between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China, 2 Int'l Legal Persp. 33 (1990). OPIC
guarantees were, however, available to U.S. investors until Congress discontinued the program in 1990 after the
Tiananmen incident, see CHEW (supra footnote 21), 34 Virg. J. Int’l L. 615, 668 et seq. (1994), On OPIC special
China program see HENRY R. BERGHOEF, OPIC in China, China Bus. Rev. 44 (Sept.-Oct. 1984); ANTHONY F
MARRA, OPIC Programs in China and Problems Faced by Investors, 3 China Law Reports 170 (1986); Overseas Private
Investment Corporation, 1987 Annual Report 26 et seq.; MARSHA A COHAN, OPIC Programs in China: An Update,
East Asian Exec. Reports (Apr. 15 1989) at 8.

33

KONG (supra footnote 3), 8 Asian Yb. Int’l L. 105, 114 (1998/1999).
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agreements34 merit the assertion that China has established a bilateral investment treaty
program that is comparable to those of traditional capital-exporting countries.35
Initially, China’s BIT practice was, however, characterized by a certain hesitance
with regard to two standards of international investment protection. It was not until the
PRC started entering into her new generation BITs that comprehensive investor-State
dispute settlement as a mechanism to resolve disputes concerning alleged violations of an
investment treaty and national treatment for foreign investors became part of the Chinese
standard practice. While the earlier BIT practice can be explained in view of China’s
traditional scepticism vis-à-vis international law and the political call for the primacy of
State sovereignty, the recent change was arguably brought about by the continuous
exposure to the needs and requirements of the global economy and China’s increasing
engagement with the international community. Both China’s desire to further attract
foreign investment as well as its interests in protecting its own investors abroad have
influenced a fundamental change of China’s earlier position on foreign investment
protection. While negotiations with the U.S. about a BIT were still ongoing, for example,
national treatment and the inclusion of a comprehensive investor-State dispute settlement
mechanism soon crystallized as the most contentious points and stalled the negotiating
process as these features were considered as essential on behalf of the U.S.36 Today, by
contrast, both standards of investment protection feature in the PRC’s new generation
treaty practice.

34

See for example on the PRC’s negotiation with the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) to establish
the China–ASEAN Free Trade Area CHUN HUIPING, China–ASEAN Investment Negotiations—The Substantive Issues, 7 J
World Inv & Trade 143 (2006). On the negotiation between the PRC and Canada of an investment protection
agreement CLIFF SOSNOW, Canada-China Investment Protection Agreement - A Significant Stepping Stone to Deeper
Economic Co-Operation, availbale at http://www.bilaterals.org/article.php3?id_article=3342 (Dec. 21, 2005).
Further China and Australia are negotiating a Free Trade Agreement that is intended to contain provision on the
protection of investment, see International Institute for Sustainable Development, Investment Treaty News (ITN), July
4, 2006, available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2006/itn_july4_2006.pdf. See also on China’s announcement to
negotiate further bilateral and regional free trade agreements China to Advance Bilateral and Regional Free Trade
Negotiation, People’s Daily, Sept. 16, 2006.

35

Cf. also CONGYAN (supra footnote 3), 7 J. World Inv. & Trade 621, 634 et seq. (2006) (emphasizing the use of BITs
as an instrument to promote and protect outward foreign direct investment from the PRC).

36

See CHEW (supra footnote 21), 34 Virg. J. Int’l L. 615, 661 (1994); STEINERT (supra footnote 32), 2 J. Chin. L. 359,
433 et seq., 452 et seq. (1988).
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III.

The Content of the PRC’s New Generation BITs

BITs are a specific type of international treaty that provides for substantive as well
as procedural protection for foreign investors against so-called political risk.37 Unlike
investment insurances or merely maintaining good relations with the host government,38
these treaties offer direct legal protection against political risk safeguarding inter alia
against direct and indirect expropriation or unfair and inequitable treatment. Most
importantly, and in stark contrast to the traditional concept of international law as a law
between nations, the ground-breaking innovation of most investment treaties is the fact
that they provide the foreign investor with a direct right to initiate arbitration and to claim
damages against the host State in an international forum.39 This removes disputes with
the host State from the imponderability of recourse to domestic courts that, in particular in
developing countries, are often biased or not sufficiently independent from the host State’s
government.
BITs do not, however, protect against the business risk that is inherent in any
investment project. Their object and purpose is, as generally enshrined in the preambles
of the treaties, the “promotion and protection of [foreign] investment”;40 they intend to
“create favourable conditions for investments in both States and to intensify the cooperation between nationals and companies in both States with a view to stimulating the

37

On the connection between international investment treaties and the reduction of political risk see also NOAH
RUBINS/STEPHAN KINSELLA, International Investment, Political Risk and Dispute Resolution, p. 1 et seq. (2005). For a
general account of BITs see Rudolf DOLZER/MARGARETE STEVENS, Bilateral Investment Treaties (1995); ANDREAS
F. LOWENFELD, International Economic Law, p. 474 et seq. (2002); Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, The International
Law of Foreign Investment, p. 315 et seq. (2nd ed. 2004); GEORGIO SACERDOTI, Bilateral Treaties and Multilateral
Instruments on Investment Protection, 269 Recueil des Cours 251 (1997).

38

Investment or political risk insurances are available on the private insurance market, from government-sponsored
entities, such as the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) in the U.S., and the Multilateral Investment
Guarantee Agency (MIGA), a political risk insurance set up pursuant to an international treaty under the auspices
of the World Bank. See JENNIFER M. DELEONARDO, Are Public And Private Political Risk Insurance Two Of A Kind?,
45 Va J. Int’l L 737, 738 (2005). Good personal relations with the host government also play a major role for
business success in China, see RAJIB N. SANYAL/TURGUT GUVENLI, Relations Between Multinational Firms and Host
Governments: The Experience of American-owned Firms in China, 9 Int’l Bus. Rev. 119 (2000). YING QIU, Personal
Networks, Institutional Involvement, and Foreign Direct Investment Flows into China’s Interior, 81 Economic Geography
261 (2005).

39

CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, Paradigmenwechsel im Internationalen Investitionsrecht, in: WALDEMAR HUMMER (ed.),
Paradigmenwechsel im Völkerrecht zur Jahrtausendwende, p. 237 (2002) (describing the advent of investor-State
arbitration as a “change in paradigm in international investment law”).

40

Agreement between the People’s Republic of China and the Federal Republic of Germany on the Encouragement
and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, signed on Dec. 1, 2003.
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productive use of resources”.41 Although the exact wording may differ from treaty to
treaty, the content of most BITs, including those of the PRC, is surprisingly uniform. In
addition, differences between BITs are leveled by the principle of the most-favored-nation
clauses usually endorsed by them.42
A.

The Scope of Application of China’s Investment Treaties

BITs apply to the only to the protection of covered investments. The notion of
investment in Chinese BITs is usually broad and exhibits little differences across the
various treaties.43 It regularly encompasses
“every kind of asset invested by investors of one Contracting State in
accordance with the laws and regulations of the other Contracting State in
the territory of the latter and in particular, though not exclusively, includes
(a) movable and immovable property as well as any other property rights
such as mortgages, liens and pledges; (b) shares, stock, debentures and any
other form of participation in a company; (c) claims to money, or to any
performance under contract having an economic value associated with an
investment […]; (d) intellectual property rights, including copyrights,
patents, industrial designs, trademarks, trade names, technical processes,
know-how and goodwill; (e) business concessions conferred by law or under
contract permitted by law, including concessions to search for, cultivate,
extract or exploit natural resources”.44
This wide definition of investment secures that all essential rights and interests
necessary for engaging in economic activities in China are covered by the substantive
protection of the investment treaty, including interests in joint ventures, contractual rights
and intellectual property rights. Similarly wide is the definition of the foreign investor that

41

Agreement between the People’s Republic of China and the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark Concerning
the Encouragement and the Reciprocal Protection of Investments, signed April 29, 1985.

42

For a discussion of MFN clauses see infra III.C.2.

43

See for an in-depth account of the notion of investment under international investment agreements in general NOAH
RUBINS, The Notion of “Investment” in International Investment Arbitration, in: HORN (ed.), Arbitrating Foreign Investment
Disputes, 283 (2004).

44

See Art. 1(1) of the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago and the
Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, signed
July 22, 2002.
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can rely on the treaty’s protection. It encompasses citizens and juridical persons
incorporated in the home State of one of the contracting parties.45
Frequently, the treaties also accord protection to investors whose investment is not
effectuated directly in the host country, but structured by means of one or several
subsidiaries.
The 2003 Sino-German BIT, for example, also covers “indirect”
investments, thereby protecting holding constructions where the investment is not directly
held by the mother company but effectuated via one or several subsidiaries.46 Similarly,
the BIT between China and Argentina stipulates:
“If natural or juridical persons of a Contracting Party have an interest in a
juridical person which was established within the territory of a third State,
and this juridical person invests in the other Contracting Party it shall be
recognized as a juridical person of the former Contracting Party.”47
The protection of indirect investments enables to structure investment projects in a
way that allows combining the protection under a Chinese BIT with advantages stemming
from the legislation of a third-State, in particular tax benefits. It also permits corporate
structuring via third-country subsidiaries in order to bring an investment under the
protection of international law in case no BIT exists between the investor’s home State
and the PRC. This is particularly important for U.S. investors who do not benefit directly
from BIT protection of their Chinese investment. By using a subsidiary that is
incorporated in a State that has entered into a BIT with China, they are able to enjoy the
protection of an investment treaty.

45

See, for example, Art. 1(2) of the Sino-German BIT, signed Dec. 1, 2003.

46

Art. 1(1) of the Sino-German BIT.

47

Art. 1(2) of the Agreement between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Government of the
Republic of Argentina on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, signed Nov. 5, 1992. The
Treaty, however, requires that the home State of the subsidiary renounces its right under general international law
to exercise to exercise diplomatic protection on behalf of the subsidiary. This has to be viewed against the backdrop
of the Barcelona Traction decision of the ICJ that only allowed the home State of the subsidiary to exercise
diplomatic protection for a violation of the rights of the corporation and denied the espousal of rights of the
shareholders. See Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v. Spain), Judgment of Feb. 05,
1970, ICJ Reports 1970, p. 2, 34 et seq. Furthermore, even in the absence of such explicit provisions arbitral
tribunals in international investment disputes tend to accept the protection of indirect investments, including those
without controlling shares. See only Siemens A.G. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Decision
on Jurisdiction of Aug. 3, 2004, par. 137 (concerning the standing of indirect shareholders absent an explicit treaty
provision to this effect); CMS Gas Transmission Company v. The Republic of Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8,
Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction of June 17, 2003, par. 48 (concerning standing of a minority shareholder);
see also STANIMIR A. ALEXANDROV, The “Baby Boom” of Treaty-Based Arbitrations and the Jurisdiction of ICSID
Tribunals – Shareholders as “Investors” under Investment Treaties, 6 J. World Inv. & Trade 387 et seq. (2005).
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An important limit exists, however, with respect to the temporal applicability of
BITs with the PRC. Their scope of application is limited to post-establishment measures.
Unlike the BITs concluded by the U.S.,48 State measures restricting the establishment of
an investment in China are not subject to the rights conferred under a BIT.49 Instead, the
admission of foreign investment is in the discretionary power of the PRC.50
Notwithstanding China’s obligations under the WTO, investment treaties therefore leave
States unrestricted in subjecting foreign investors to pre-establishment approval or
excluding them from specific sectors of the economy.
B.

Dispute Settlement Mechanism under Chinese BITs

By far the most important provisions in international investment treaties concern
the procedural protection offered to foreign investors. BITs traditionally provide not only
for State-to-State dispute settlement but also for investor-State arbitration. Compared to
traditional means of enforcing public international law through diplomatic protection
granted by the investor’s home State,51 this empowerment of private investors has

48

See KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaties: The Second Wave, 14 Mich. J. Int'l L. 621 (1993);
KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, A Brief History of International Investment Agreements, 12 U.C. Davis J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 157
(2005).

49

Concerning the establishment of foreign investment in China, a representative clause is, for instance, contained in
the BIT between China and Uruguay that provides in its Art. 2 that “[e]ach Contracting Party shall encourage
investors of the other Contracting Party to make investments in its territory and admit such investments in
accordance with its laws and regulations”.49 Similarly, according to the Sino-Britain BIT investment shall be
admitted “subject to its right to exercise power conferred by its laws”. See Art. 2(1) of the Agreement between the
Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People’s
Republic of China Concerning the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments signed May 15, 1986.

50

WENSHUA SHAN, Legal Framework, p. 119.

51

In case of an alleged violation of the rights of a foreign investor, traditional international law only allowed the
investor’s home State to grant diplomatic protection. The dispute was exclusively a dispute between States. See
BORCHARD, The Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad or the Law of International Claims (1916). Classical
international law thus mediated the investor through an inter-State prism, see OPPENHEIM, International Law, § 20
(2nd ed. 1912). See also the classical expression of this view in The Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v.
Britain), Judgment No. 2 of August 30, 1924, 1924 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 2, at 12: “In the case of the Mavrommatis
concessions it is true that the dispute was at first between a private person and a State – i.e. between M. Mavrommatis and Great
Britain. Subsequently, the Greek Government took up the case. The dispute then entered upon on new phase; it entered the
domain of international law, and became a dispute between two States. […] It is an elementary principle of international law
that a State is entitled to protect its subjects, when injured by acts contrary to international law committed by another State, from
whom they have been unable to obtain satisfaction through the ordinary channels. By taking up the case of one of its subjects and
by resorting to diplomatic action or international judicial proceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own rights –
its right to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for the rules of international law. The question, therefore, whether the
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accurately been described as a “change in paradigm in international investment law”.52
Instead of depending on the discretion of its home State to grant diplomatic protection,53
most BITs provide the covered investors with a unilateral right to initiate arbitral
proceedings against the host country which usually gives general and advance consent to
arbitration.54
In standard international practice, investor-State arbitration is most often
conducted under the rules of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes (ICSID)..55 The specificities of ICSID arbitration are the finality of its awards
and their automatic recognition in the Convention’s member States. Unlike awards in
international commercial arbitration, ICSID awards are only subject to Conventionspecific annulment proceedings,56 not, however, to domestic review according to the law
in force at the arbitration’s situs. Furthermore, the enforcement State is prevented from
invoking its public policy (order public) against the enforcement of an ICSID award.57
Instead, member States have to “recognize an award […] as binding and enforce [it]

present dispute originates in an injury to a private interest, which in point of fact is the case in many international disputes, is
irrelevant from this standpoint.”
52

CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, Paradigmenwechsel im Internationalen Investitionsrecht, in: WALDEMAR HUMMER (ed.),
Paradigmenwechsel im Völkerrecht zur Jahrtausendwende, p. 237 et seq. (2002).

53

Generally, no internal obligation of a State exists to pursue claims against a foreign State on an international level.
See e. g. on the legal situation in Germany RAINER HOFMANN, Grundrechte und grenzüberschreitende Sachverhalte,
1994, p. 107 et seq. with further reference to literature and judicial decisions. On the situation in the UK see Abbasi
v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, English Court of Appeal, [2002] E.W.C.A. Civ. 1598. Ultimately, this
discretion is the expression of the difference in the legal relation between the investor and the host State, on the one
hand, and the relationship between the two States.

54

See on the specificities of the consent to arbitration under modern investment treaties BARTON LEGUM, Emerging
Fora for International Litigation (Part 1): The Innovation of Investor-State Arbitration Under NAFTA, 43 Harv. J. Int’l L.
531 (2002).

55

The Centre was established by the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and
Nationals of Other States (ICSID Convention) in 1966, 575 U.N.T.S. 159. China signed the ICSID Convention on
Feb. 9, 1990.
It entered in to force on Feb. 6, 1993.
For a list of contracting States see
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/conState/c-States-en.htm. Being ratified by 142 States as of today, including
China, most foreign investors are able to avail themselves of the investor-State dispute settlement mechanism if they
feel that the PRC violated provisions of the relevant bilateral investment treaty.

56

See Art. 52 ICSID Convention.

57

CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, ICSID Convention: A Commentary, Art. 54 par. 71 (2001). This differs from international
commercial arbitration enforced pursuant to the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign Arbitral Awards, done at New York on 10 June 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 (“New York Convention”)
where Art. V allows the enforcement state to invoke its ordre public in order to deny enforcement of an arbitral
award.
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within its territory as if it were a final judgment of a court in that State”.58 Investment
treaty arbitration provides for recourse to adjudication before an international and
independent forum and is therefore particularly salient for investors in countries where the
domestic judicial system is underdeveloped, politically biased, or corrupt.59
1.

The Limited Scope of Investor-State Arbitration in the PRC’s Old-Generation BITs

Initially the PRC has been hesitant to consent to investor-State arbitration as a
means to settle disputes under its BITs.60 The first BIT with Sweden did not contain
investor-State dispute provisions at all. According to an accompanying letter of the
Swedish Government, this was due to the fact that China had not become a party of the
ICSID Convention. The Contracting Parties had, however, agreed that upon the PRC’s
accessions to the Convention, the BIT would “be supplemented with a supplementary
agreement on a binding system for the settlement of disputes within the framework of the

58

Art. 54(1) ICSID Convention. The only loophole enabling States to refuse recognition and enforcement of an
ICSID award is State immunity (see Art. 55 ICSID Convention). See on State immunity as a bar to enforcement of
ICSID awards comprehensively SCHREUER (supra footnote 57), Art. 55.

59

This does, however, not exclude that the domestic legal system actually offers possibilities for foreign investors to
challenge conduct by the host state. See on possibilities for foreign investors to challenge the acts of administrative
agencies in the PRC, for example, DAVID L. WELLER, The Bureaucratic Heavy Hand in China: Legal Means for Foreign
Investors to Challenge Agency Action, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 1238 (1998).

60

International Arbitration between foreign investors and Chinese partners, by contrast, is frequently used in business
relations with China. It poses, however, its own respective problems. See for example GE LIU, International
Commercial Arbitration in China: History, New Developments, and Current Practice, 28 J. Marshall L. Rev. 539 (1995);
CHARLES KENWORTHEY HARER, Arbitration Fails to Reduce Foreign Investors’ Risk in China, 8 Pac. Rim L. & Pol’y J.
393 (1999); GEORGE O. WHITE III, Navigating the Cultural Malaise: Foreign Direct Investment Dispute Resolution in the
People’s Republic of China, 5 Transactions: Tenn. J. Bus. L. 55 (2003); JINGZHOU TAO, Arbitration Law and

Practice in China (2004); JEROME A. COHEN/NEIL KAPLAN/PETER MALANCZUK/DANIEL R. FUNG/WANG
SHENG CHANG, Arbitration in China: A Practical Guide (2004); Marie Kidwell/James Brown, China: A Perspective on
International Arbitration in China, Recent Developments and CIETAC Arbitration, 20 Const. L. J. 253 (2004);
ARTHUR ANYUAN YUAN, Enforcing and Collecting Money Judgments in China from a U.S. Judgment
Creditor’s Perspective, 36 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. 757 (2004); JIAN ZHOU, Judicial Intervention in International
Arbitration: A Comparative Study of the Scope of the New York Convention in U.S. and Chinese Courts, 15 Pac. Rim L. &
Pol’y 402 (2006). See also various contributions on arbitration in China in the Proceedings of the 17th ICCA
Conference, hosted by the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC) on 16-18
May 2004 in Beijing, China, ALBERT JAN VAN DEN BERG (ed.), New Horizons in International Commercial Arbitration
and Beyond (2004); HEYE, Forum Selection for International Dispute Resolution in China – Chinese Courts vs. CIETAC, 27
Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 535 (2004); CARLOS DE VERA, Arbitrating Harmony: ‘MED-ARB’ and the Confluence of
Culture and Rule of Law in the Resolution of International Commercial Disputes in China, 18 Colum. J Asian L 149, fn. 126
(2004); JIAN ZHOU, Arbitration Agreements in China: Battles on Designation of Arbitral Institution and Ad Hoc Arbitration,
23 J. Int’l. Arb. 145 (2006).
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International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes”.61 Yet, even before the PRC
signed the ICSID Convention on Feb. 9, 1990,62 it started agreeing to investor-State
dispute settlement by ad hoc tribunals in a number of pre-1990 BITs. The treaties,
however, contained only a limited consent to investor-State arbitration; they exclusively
allowed for investor-State disputes concerning the amount of compensation due in case of
expropriation.63
A typical clause concerning ad hoc settlement of disputes between an investor and a
Contracting Party can, for example, be found in the Sino-Singaporean BIT. Its Art. 13(3)
provides:
“If a dispute involving the amount of compensation resulting from
expropriation, nationalization, or other measures having effect equivalent to
nationalization or expropriation, […] cannot be settled within six months
after resort to negotiation […] by the national or company concerned, it
may be submitted to an international arbitral tribunal established by both
parties.”64
Even after China’s accession to ICSID, it retained her limited consent to investorState arbitration. Upon ratification of the Convention, she notified the ICSID Secretariat
that “the Chinese government would only consider submitting to the jurisdiction of ICSID
disputes over compensation resulting from expropriation or nationalization”.65
Given that expropriations increasingly constituted a negligible political risk and
instead other forms of host State misconduct, such as violations of judicial and
61

See the letter dated March 20, 1982 of Sweden’s ambassador
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/china_sweden.pdf.

62

It entered in to force on Feb. 6, 1993; see http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/conState/c-States-en.htm.

63

WENSHUA SHAN, Legal Framework, p. 200. In addition, the covered investments did not benefit from the
considerable advantages of the ICSID Convention; see supra footnotes 55-59 and accompanying text.

64

Art. 13(3) of the Agreement between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the
Republic of Singapore on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, signed Nov. 21, 1985.

65

See FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS DERINGER, Resolving Disputes in China through Arbitration, p. 53 (2006), available at see
http://www.freshfields.com/publications/pdfs/2006/14706.pdf. This notification is, however, not a reservation to
the ICSID Convention in the technical sense of Art. 19-23 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331. Instead, it constitutes a notification under Art. 25(4) ICSID Convention, according to which “[a]ny
Contracting State may, at the time of ratification, acceptance or approval of this Convention or at any time
thereafter, notify the Centre of the class or classes of disputes which it would or would not consider submitting to
the jurisdiction of the Centre. The Secretary-General shall forthwith transmit such notification to all Contracting
States. Such notification shall not constitute the consent required by paragraph (1).” See Report of the Executive
Directors on the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other
States, in: ICSID (ed.), ICSID Convention, Regulations and Rules, p. 35, 46 (2006), available at
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/basicdoc/CRR_English-final.pdf.
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administrative due process, negatively affected foreign investors across the globe,66
China’s limited consent to investor-State arbitration vitiated the effectiveness of the
dispute settlement mechanism. In addition, the limited access to ICSID arbitration in
China’s early BITs decreased their value as an investment protection tool. Overall, the
limited scope of the PRC’s consent to investor-State arbitration in its old generation BITs
therefore compromised their effectiveness as mechanisms for investment protection, since
home States are often reluctant to grant diplomatic protection, in particular for small or
medium-sized investment projects. If at all, protection under China’s old generation BITs
against undue government measures could only be obtained before domestic courts67 that
are hardly a sufficient bulwark against governmental interferences in view of the lack of
judicial independence and the existence of corruption in the PRC court system.68
2.

Investor-State Dispute Settlement in Recent Treaty Practice

The unsatisfactory situation caused by the limited scope of investor-State dispute
settlement changed fundamentally with the advent of China’s new generation BITs.
Beginning in the late 1990’s, the PRC started agreeing to comprehensive dispute
settlement provisions. It consented, like under the BIT with Botswana, to international
arbitration for “any dispute between an investor of one Contracting Party and the other
Contracting Party” either under the ICSID Convention or before an ad hoc tribunal.69 This
broad clause allowed investors not only to resolve disputes concerning the amount of

66

See MINOR, The Demise of Expropriation as an Instrument of LDC Policy, 1980-1992, 25 J. Int’l. Bus. Stud. 177, 180
(1994).

67

This option is explicitly mentioned by most old generation BITs. See, for example, the Art 9(2) of the Agreement
between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Government of the State of Bahrain
Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment (providing that “[i]f any dispute cannot be
settled amicably through negotiations within five months of the date of resort to negotiations as specified in
paragraph 1 of this Article then an investor of one Contracting Party may submit the dispute to the competent court
of the Contracting Party accepting the investment”).

68

On the problem of corruption in the Chinese judiciary see, for example, BERNSTEIN/XIAOBO, Taxation without
representation in Rural China, p. 109 et seq. (2003); see also HRIC, The Wuhan Court Bribery Case, Human Rights
Forum no. 1, 2005, p. 30 (describing several bribing techniques in China). More generally on the problem of
corruption in the judiciary see BUSCAGLIA/DAKOLIAS, An Analysis Of The Causes Of Corruption In The Judiciary, 30
Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 95 (1999), DAKOLIAS/THACHUK, The Problem Of Eradicating Corruption From The Judiciary:
Attacking Corruption In The Judiciary: A Critical Process In Judicial Reform, 18 Wis. Int'l L.J. 353 (2000).

69

Art. 9 of the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Botswana and the Government of the People’s
Republic of China on Promotion and Protection of Investments, signed June 12, 2000. The first comprehensive
dispute settlement mechanism was included in Art. 9 of the 1998 China-Barbados BIT.
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compensation in expropriation cases, but to invoke all substantive rights granted in the
applicable BIT.70
As remaining access-restrictions to investor-State dispute arbitration, the new
generation treaties only require the investor to eschew a waiting period of six months and
to exhaust China’s new Administrative Review Procedure. The purpose of this
administration-internal review mechanism is to determine whether the conduct of
administrative agencies was legal and appropriate under Chinese law. It does, however,
not involve court proceedings and is thus different from the exhaustion of local remedies.71
While one may wonder whether the review procedure is an effective remedy
against undue conduct of the Chinese administration, it does not obstruct the effectiveness
of investor-State dispute settlement under the PRC’s new generation BITs. Yet, it is
interesting to speculate about the motives behind this procedural requirement. Given that
the introduction of the Administrative Review Procedure in 1999 and its appearance in
China’s BITs in 2000 coincide, it seems probable that the PRC’s intention behind
requiring the investor to submit to this procedure as a prerequisite for international
arbitration was to strengthen the effectiveness of this newly created domestic remedy and
the domestic institutions in charge of it.72 The compulsory recourse to this local remedy
may thus be less motivated by suspicion vis-à-vis international arbitration, but driven by
the desire to build domestic institutions that can correct the eventual failure of public
authorities in dealing with foreign investors. Ultimately, this endeavour should, therefore,
benefit foreign investors in China if the reviewing agencies engage in a close scrutiny of
administrative conduct.
It is interesting to note, that the introduction of comprehensive investor-State
dispute settlement in China’s BIT practice did not occur first in a treaty with a traditional
70

Some of the clauses are even broad enough to apply to any investment dispute between a covered investor and the
PRC, independent from the violation of substantive rights under the pertinent BIT. They would thus allow to bring
treaty claims and contract claims. Cf. JÖRN GRIEBEL, Die Einbeziehung von “contract claims” in internationale
Investitionsstreitigkeiten
über
Streitbeilegungsklauseln
in
Investitionsschutzabkommen,
4
Zeitschrift
für
Schiedsverfahren/German Arbitration Journal 306 (2006).

71

See Law of the People’s Republic of China on Administrative Reconsideration, adopted at the 9th Meeting of the
Standing Committee of the Ninth National People’s Congress on April 29, 1999. See on the Administrative
Review Procedure ALBERT CHEN, An Introduction to the Legal System of the People’s Republic of China, p. 228 et seq.
(2004).

72

Compare in this respect SUSAN D. FRANCK, Foreign Direct Investment, Investment Treaty Arbitration and the Rule of Law,
Transnational
Lawyer
2006
(forthcoming),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=882443 (analyzing an often-raised argument against
investment treaty arbitration as bypassing and thus weakening domestic courts and institutions).
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capital-exporting country but was introduced in a number of South-South BITs with other
developing countries.73 This could suggest that in relation to these countries the PRC is
behaving like a traditional capital-exporting country that attempts to secure its investment
abroad without much probability of being involved as respondent in any investor-State
dispute.74 The same pattern of dispute settlement provisions was, however, also
introduced in China’s recent BITs with capital-exporting European States, namely the BIT
with the Netherlands in 2001 and the BIT with Germany in 2003. These treaties also
contain comprehensive investor-State dispute settlement procedures. The Sino-German
BIT, for example, provides in Art. 9 “that any dispute concerning investments […] shall,
at the request of the investor of the other Contracting State, be submitted for arbitration”.75
Limitations are only contained in the accompanying protocol that requires foreign
investor to submit the dispute to the Administrative Review Procedure. Yet, it opens
recourse to international arbitration if “the dispute still exists three months after he [i. e.
the investor] has brought the issue to the review procedure”.76 Providing therefore for
effective enforcement of investor’s rights, China’s new generation BITs “mark another
significant step forward”77 in the country’s integration into the international economy and
enhance the protection of foreign investors in the PRC significantly.
C.

Substantive Investors’ Rights Conferred under BITs

China’s BITs also developed in terms of the substantive protection offered to
foreign investors. While the PRC was traditionally hesitant to one of the standard
guarantees in international investment protection, namely the guarantee of national
treatment, its new generation BITs also increasingly conform to international standards in
this respect. The other investor’s rights, such as the protection against direct and indirect
expropriation, fair and equitable treatment, full protection and security, and the right to
transfer and repatriate profits, by contrast, remained largely unchanged. Yet, due to the

73

See further the treaties with Barbados, Benin, Botswana, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brunei, Burma, Cyprus, Ivory
Cost, Djibouti, Guyana, Jordan, Latvia, Mozambique, North Korea, Kenya, Sierra Leone, Trinidad and Tobago,
Tunisia and Uganda.
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In this sense CONGYAN (supra footnote 3), 7 J. World Inv. & Trade 621, 646 et seq. (2006); criticial with respect to
this change in China’s BIT practice AN CHEN, Should the Four Great Safeguards in Sino-Foreign BITs be Hastily
Dismantled?, 7 J. World Inv. & Trade 899 (2006).
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See Art. 9 of the Sino-German BIT; parallel Art. 10 of the Sino-Dutch BIT.

76

See Ad Article 9 of the Protocol to the Sino-German BIT.
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WENSHUA SHAN, Legal Framework, p. 215.
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introduction of comprehensive investor-state dispute settlement, they are now readily
enforceable by foreign investors and do not remain in the realm of inter-state relations.
1.

National Treatment

National treatment is one of the core guarantees regularly endorsed in international
BIT practice.78 It aims at creating a level playing field between local and foreign investors
as a prerequisite for equal competition. It requires the host State to accord equal
treatment to foreign investors without discriminating on grounds of nationality.
a)

Limited National Treatment in China’s Old Generation BITs

Initially, China’s old generation BITs were reluctant to include national treatment.
At the most, they contained provisions similar to the one found in the Sino-British treaty
that provides that
“either Contracting Party shall to the extent possible, accord treatment in
accordance with the stipulations of its laws and regulations to the investment of
nationals or companies of the other Contracting Party the same treatment as
that accorded to its own nationals or companies”.79
The reference to domestic law and the limitation of the obligation to accord
national treatment “to the extent possible” limited this guarantee of national treatment
considerably. In essence, the framing of this provision reduced its normative content to
undertake good will efforts to adopt equal treatment of foreign investors and remained
largely symbolic.80
Only few older Chinese BITs contained national treatment provisions that went
beyond the language of the Sino-British Treaty. Art. 3(2) of the BIT with Japan from
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DOLZER/STEVENS, Bilateral Investment Treaties, p. 63 et seq. (1995).
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Art. 3(3) of the Sino-Britain BIT, signed on May 15, 1986 (emphasis added). Similar clauses are contained in
several Chinese BITs. See, for example, Art. 3(3) of the Agreement between the Government of the People’s
Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of Iceland Concerning the Promotion and Reciprocal
Protection of Investments, signed on Mar. 31, 1994; Art. 3(2) of the Agreement between the Government of the
People’s Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of Slovenia Concerning the Encouragement and
Reciprocal Protection of Investments, signed Sept. 13, 1993.
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KONG (supra footnote 3), 8 Asian Yb. Int’l L. 105, 124 (1998/1999); WENSHUA SHAN, Legal Framework, p.
153; WENSHUA SHAN, National Treatment for Foreign Investment Enterprises and the Conditions for Its Implementation, 5
Social Sciences in China 128, 132 (1998).
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1988, for example, contained a somewhat broader national treatment clause, according to
which
“[t]he treatment accorded by either Contracting Party within its territory to
nationals and companies of the other Contracting Party with respect to
investments, returns and business activities in connection with the
investment shall not be less favourable than that accorded to nationals and
companies of the former Contracting Party.”81
While some commentators considered this clause as a “milestone” in China’s
investment treaty practice,82 the Sino-Japanese national treatment provision was, however,
significantly limited by the treaty’s Additional Protocol.83 Art. 3 of the Protocol explicitly
provides that with respect to national treatment
“it shall not be deemed ‘treatment less favourable’ for either Contracting
Party to accord discriminatory treatment, in accordance with its laws and
regulations, to national and companies of the other Contracting Party, in
case it is really necessary for the reason of public order, national security or
sound development of national economy.”84
Especially the exceptions for “public order” and “sound development of national
economy” allow considerable leeway for the PRC to uphold existing and to introduce new
discriminations of Japanese investors. In addition, it is likely that an arbitral tribunal
would consider both exceptions as self-judging and, accordingly, defer to the host State’s
margin of appreciation in evaluating whether a specific discrimination aimed at upholding
public order or at furthering economic development. This is particularly true with respect

81

See Art. 3(2) of the Agreement between Japan and the People’s Republic of China Concerning the Encouragement
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to economic development that involves policy considerations that are difficult to
scrutinize by arbitral tribunals in view of their close connections to the host State’s
sovereignty.85
The reasons for China’s hesitance with respect to national treatment are not
completely clear. Besides the fact that foreign investment has always taken a route
different from local entities in China, the reasons for not according national treatment to
foreign investors presumably derive from the need to create a system that allows for
foreign investment while at the same time upholding structures of a socialist planning
economy.86 In particular, the desire to uphold existing privileges of state-owned
enterprises and to protect them against competition by foreign investors may have been
the PRC’s central objection to national treatment.87 At the same time, the lack of national
treatment was often not a significant disadvantage for foreign investors given that the
domestic laws governing foreign investment in China are in many regards more favorable
to foreign investors than to domestic private investors.88 Still, regulatory disadvantages
persist compared to state-owned enterprises.89 In addition, foreign investors de facto often
receive less favourable treatment in domestic courts and administrative proceedings.90
Finally, not including national treatment in its investment treaties left the PRC at liberty
to grant new privileges to domestic actors and to discriminate against foreign investors.
b)

National Treatment in China’s New Generation BITs

Parallel to including comprehensive investor-state dispute settlement provisions,
the PRC also started agreeing to national treatment in its new generation BITs on a
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broader basis. Starting in late 2001 with the BIT with the Netherlands, the PRC
increasingly often includes general national treatment in its BITs.91 The 2003 SinoGerman BIT, for instance, provides that
“[e]ach Contracting Party shall accord to investments and activities
associated with such investments by the investors of the other Contracting
Party treatment not less favourable than that accorded to the investments
and associated activities by its own investors.”92
At the same time, China’s new generation BITs still contain some restrictions to
full national treatment. Above all, they include a so-called “grandfather clause” either
directly in the treaty or in an additional protocol that provides
“do[es] not apply to
(a) any existing non-conforming measures maintained within its territory;
(b) the continuation of any such non-conforming measure;
(c) any amendment to any such non-conforming measure to the extent that
the amendment does not increase the non-conformity of these measures.
The People’s Republic of China will take all appropriate steps in order to
progressively remove the non-conforming measures.”93
These provisions allow China to uphold existing measures that do not conform to
national treatment, while prohibiting the introduction of new discriminations or privileges
for domestic economic investors (so-called “standstill”). In addition, the provision
illustrates that the PRC is willing to continuously abandon non-conforming measures (so-

91

Yet, at least one earlier BIT contained a national treatment provision for Chinese investors in Peru but not vice
versa. See Ad Articles 3 and 5 of the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Peru and the
Government of the People’s Republic of China Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of
Investments, signed on June 9, 1994.

92

See Art. 3(2) of the Sino-German BIT.

93

Ad. Art 2 and 3 of the Sino-German BIT. Similar provisions on national treatment, including the “grandfather
clause”, are also contained in other new generation BITs, such as the BIT with the Netherlands (see Art. 3(3) of the
Sino-Dutch BIT), Bosnia and Herzegovina (see Art. 3(1) and Ad Art. 3 of the Agreement between the People’s
Republic of China and Bosnia and Herzegovina on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, signed on June
26, 2002) and the Slovak Republic. The PRC and the Slovak Republic agreed in an Additional Protocol to the
earlier treaty between China and the Czech and Slovak Republic to extend the national treatment provision in Art.
3(1). See Additional Protocol between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the Government of the People’s
Republic of China to the Agreement between the Government of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic and the
Government of the People’s Republic of China for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments;
national treatment is, however, subject to a “grandfather clause” in Art. 3(4) of the Treaty.

22

called “rollback”).94 Notwithstanding these limitations to national treatment, the
inclusion of broader national treatment in its new generation BITs undoubtedly
constitutes a major development in the PRC’s BIT practice and reiterates the PRC’s
commitment to competitive structures that are at the basis of a market-economy.
National treatment will allow foreign investors to rely on more favorable provisions
that apply only to domestic investors even if the overall package of the legal framework for
foreign investors may be more favorable to the foreigner. National treatment may thus
allow foreign investors to cherry-pick from the various regimes that apply to foreign
investors on the one hand and domestic investors on the other.95 Possibly, national
treatment can also be used to strike down differences in treatment between different
sectors of the economy. Indeed, some arbitral decisions point in this direction,96 while
others handle national treatment more restrictively and only allow for a sector-specific
comparison between foreign and domestic investors.97 Ultimately, further developments
and clarifications in the jurisprudence of investment tribunals in this context will have to
be awaited.
While one may be inclined to explain the change in the PRC’s foreign investment
policy in terms of the negotiating power of its contracting parties, in particular Germany
and the Netherlands, it seems that the reasons have to be sought elsewhere, in particular
since broader national treatment is now also included in the BITs with other developing
countries like Bosnia and Herzegovina. Possibly, China’s interest in protecting its own
investment ventures abroad may have lead to including national treatment as a general
principle into its new generation investment treaties.98 In this context, the PRC’s dual
94

The terms “standstill” and “rollback” are used to designate the comparable principles governing non-discrimination
under the OECD’s Code of Liberalisation of Capital Movements and the OECD’s Code of Liberalisation of
Current Invisible Operations. See OECD, OECD Codes of Liberalisation of Capital Movements and of Current Invisible
Operations – User’s Guide, p. 10 (2003), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/14/13/1935919.pdf.

95

Compare Siemens A.G. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Decision on Jurisdiction of Aug. 3,
2004, par. 108-120 (allowing the parallel case of “cherry-picking” under the most-favored-nation clause).

96

See Occidental Exploration and Production Company v. The Republic of Ecuador, LCIA Case No. UN3467, Final Award
of July 1, 2004, par. 167 et seq.; LG&E Energy Corp., LG&E Capital Corp., LG&E International Inc. v. Argentine Republic,
ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision On Liability of Oct. 3, 2006, par. 164 et seq.

97

Methanex Corporation v. United States of America, UNCITRAL, Final Award of Aug. 3, 2005, Part IV - Chapter C
Rdnr. 25; CMS Gas Transmission Company v. The Republic of Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award of May
12, 2005, par. 285 et seq.

98

This becomes particularly clear with respect to the asymmetric national treatment provision in the Sino-Peruvian
BIT, see supra footnote 91. Differently CONGYAN (supra footnote 3), 7 J. World Inv. & Trade 621, 641 (2006)
(suggesting that the inclusion of national treatment is mainly a function of negotiating pressure from developed
countries).

23

position as a capital-importer, as well as an emerging capital-exporter, arguably leads to a
trade-off between its interests as a host country consisting in upholding its sovereignty and
regulatory leeway to the greatest possible extent and its interests as a home State in
protecting its foreign investors abroad.
Another reason for China’s fundamental policy change may be seen in her
accession to the WTO,99 itself constituting a regime that relies on non-discrimination and
national treatment as one of its core principles.100 Finally, the development towards
comprehensive national treatment is also closely connected with China’s economy
increasingly assuming structures of a market economy that fundamentally relies on
competition as a mechanism to allocate resources efficiently. This is paradigmatically
illustrated by the introduction of a provision in the Chinese Constitution in 1993 that
henceforth classifies the country’s economic system as a “socialist market economy”.101
2.

Most-Favored-Nation Treatment

The change in China’s BIT practice does, however, also have repercussions on its
existing and more restrictive old generation BIT because of the principle of most-favorednation (MFN) treatment contained in all Chinese BITs. Under MFN treatment the
Contracting Parties enter into an obligation to
“treat investments and activities associated with investments in its own
territory […] on a basis no less favourable than that accorded to investments
and activities associated with investments of nationals of any third
country”.102
MFN treatment thus aims at creating equal competitive conditions for all foreign
investors independent from their nationality.103
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a)

Extending the Substantive Protection of Old Generation BITs

On the basis of an MFN clause a foreign investor is able to invoke benefits that the
host State extended to investors from a third State, for example through more favourable
BIT provisions.104 The MFN clause in China’s BITs therefore has considerable weight
since her new generation investment grant broader protection to foreign investors. For
instance, by means of the MFN clause contained in the Sino-British BIT,105 a U.K.
investor can benefit from the more comprehensive national treatment obligation contained
in the 2003 Sino-German BIT.
b)

Extending the Procedural Protection of Old Generation BITs?

Yet, the operation of an MFN clause is not limited to substantive investor’s rights.
In arbitral practice, the MFN clause has also been interpreted so as to encompass more
favorable conditions concerning the dispute settlement mechanism under BITs. In the
ICSID case Maffezini v. Spain, for example, the Tribunal held that, by means of the MFN
clause, the foreign investor was not bound by a waiting period contained in the BIT
between Argentina and Spain but could rely on more favorable conditions in another
Spanish BIT that allowed initiating investor-State arbitration more quickly.106 The main
reason for the Tribunal to extend MFN treatment to investor-State arbitration was that the
procedural rights were “inextricably related to the protection of foreign investors“.107
While the operation of the most-favored-nation clause to circumvent restrictions
concerning the admissibility of an investor-State claim has been uniformly confirmed in
subsequent arbitral jurisprudence,108 it is contentious whether it can also broaden the
Treatment in International Investment Law, OECD Working Papers on International Investment 2004/2, p. 2,
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/21/37/33773085.pdf.
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jurisdiction of a tribunal. In view of the PRC’s limited consent to investor-State
arbitration in its old generation BITs, the question, therefore, arises whether investors can
rely on MFN treatment in old generation treaties in order to bring disputes that do not
concern the amount of compensation for expropriation but relate to the violation of other
substantive rights, such as fair and equitable treatment, as covered by the consent in
China’s new generation BITs.
In the ICSID case Plama v. Bulgaria, the Tribunal declined such a request by a
Cypriot investor.109 While the arbitration clause in the Cyprus-Bulgaria BIT only allowed
– like China’s old generation BITs – ad hoc arbitration concerning the amount of
compensation for expropriation, other Bulgarian BITs provided for comprehensive
investor-State dispute resolution. Unlike the Maffezini-decision, the Tribunal held that in
order to benefit from the broader consent in subsequent BITs, the basic treaty’s MFN
clause must explicitly encompass investor-State dispute settlement. It emphasized that
“the reference must be such that the parties’ intention to import the arbitration provision
of the other agreement is clear and unambiguous.”110 This doctrinal approach mirrored
the more restrictive jurisprudence on binding non-signatories to an arbitration clause in
the context of commercial arbitration between private parties.111
Although the decision has been approved by subsequent tribunals,112 it is
questionable whether its argument is sustainable in investment treaty arbitration. The
main reason for being skeptical in this respect is that the provisions on investor-State
dispute settlement are arguably the most important rights accorded to foreign investors
because they effectively allow enforcing compliance with the host State’s obligations
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under an international investment treaty for substantive rights that fall short of any legal
effect without enforcement mechanism.113 It would, thus, appear to be surprising if States
that agree to most-favored-nation treatment would not include the most important
investor’s right, i. e. the right to initiate investment arbitration. To be sure, in light of the
existing precedents, the operation of the MFN clause in this context will also become an
issue for future investor-State disputes with the PRC. The solution will depend on
whether arbitral tribunals extend the reasoning in Maffezini to issues of jurisdiction or
whether the Plama award will establish itself as the relevant line of argument.114
3.

Fair and Equitable Treatment

While national and MFN treatment constitute relative standards that depend on
the treatment accorded to a reference group, fair and equitable treatment is an absolute
standard that grants protection independent of the host State’s treatment of its own
nationals. Absent any clear and unequivocal definition, the exact content of fair and
equitable treatment has, however, not been authoritatively determined. In particular,
there is a vivid debate as to whether this treaty standard is equivalent to the international
minimum standard of treatment under customary international law or whether it
constitutes a free-standing treaty obligation that can be interpreted and applied
independently.115 In the practice of arbitral tribunals, the standard is regularly specified on
a case-by-case basis.116
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The arbitral tribunal in Waste Management v. Mexico, for example, summarized the
existing arbitral jurisprudence on fair and equitable treatment as
“suggest[ing] that the minimum standard of treatment of fair and equitable
treatment is infringed by conduct attributable to the State and harmful to the
claimant if the conduct is arbitrary, grossly unfair, unjust or idiosyncratic, is
discriminatory and exposes the claimant to sectional or racial prejudice, or
involves a lack of due process leading to an outcome which offends judicial
propriety – as might be the case with a manifest failure of natural justice in
judicial proceedings or a complete lack of transparency and candour in an
administrative process. In applying this standard it is relevant that the
treatment is in breach of representations made by the host State which were
reasonably relied on by the claimant.”117
In arbitral jurisprudence the standard is regularly applied in a broad manner, using
it as a reference for the conduct of the national legislator, domestic administration and
domestic courts. From a more conceptual perspective, fair and equitable treatment can be
understood as an embodiment of the rule of law that serves as an overarching principle for
all branches of domestic government.118 The jurisprudence of investment tribunals
interpreting fair and equitable treatment regularly has recourse to certain sub-elements that
run parallel to the concept of the rule of law in domestic legal systems that endorse legal
and political traditions of liberal democracies. In this context, fair and equitable treatment
includes the requirement of stability and predictability of the legal framework and
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consistency in the host State’s decision-making, the principle of legality, the protection of
investor confidence or legitimate expectations, procedural due process and denial of
justice, protection against discrimination and arbitrariness, the requirement of
transparency and the concept of reasonableness and proportionality.119
Based on a violation of fair and equitable treatment, arbitral tribunals have, for
instance, ordered host States to pay damages to foreign investors for the refusal to grant or
to prolong an operating license for a waste landfill.120 Similarly, denial of justice by
domestic courts is considered to constitute a violation of fair and equitable treatment.121
In two cases involving Argentina’s 2001 emergency legislation, even the national legislator
has been found to have violated the fair and equitable treatment standard by
fundamentally changing the regulatory regime for investments in the country’s energy
sector and thereby contravening the legitimate expectations of affected investors.122
Overall, fair and equitable treatment is one of the most influential investor’s guarantees,
having the potential to shape domestic administrative law, influence the deployment of
judicial proceedings and serve as a quasi-constitutional standard that sets limits to the
activity of the national legislator. It grants, inter alia, procedural rights in administrative
proceedings such as the right to be heard, the requirement to give reasons for
administrative decision-making and provide for protection against retroactive legislation.
It may be particularly useful for foreign investors to tackle the rampant problems of
China’s “unruly bureaucracy” that is characterized by a lack of control by courts, wide
discretion and arbitrariness of administrative agencies and corruption.123 Investment
arbitration under China’s BITs and the fair and equitable treatment standard may thus
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also be a way to cope with the massive center-periphery problem in the PRC stemming
deficiencies in law enforcement by local administrative agents.124
4.

Full Protection and Security

Closely connected to the fair and equitable treatment standard is the guarantee of
full protection and security that is included in virtually all Chinese BITs. Its main content
is the obligation of the host State to protect investments by conferring police protection
against physical interferences by private actors, such as demonstrating or rioting
individuals.125 The concept was held to be violated, for instance, in a case of destruction
of foreign-owned commercial property by the host State’s armed forces.126
5.

Protection Against Expropriation

Given China’s history of expropriations of foreign investors after the communist
take-over,127 another important investor’s right is the protection against expropriation
contained in all Chinese BITs. The Sino-German BIT, for instance, provides that
“[i]nvestments by investors of either Contracting Party shall not directly or
indirectly be expropriated, nationalized or subjected to any other measure
the effects of which would be tantamount to expropriation or
nationalization in the territory of the other Contracting Party (hereinafter
referred to as expropriation)”.128
a)

Direct and Indirect Expropriation

Expropriation does not only comprise direct expropriations or nationalizations that
involve the transfer of title from the foreign investor to the State or a third-party. Its scope
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is broader and also covers so-called indirect, creeping or de facto expropriations, involving
state measures that do interfere with the owner’s title but negatively affect the property’s
substance or void the owner’s control of it.129 In light of receding numbers of direct
expropriations,130 this pattern of host State conduct is an important instrument for the
protection of foreign investors and enables foreign investors to challenge measures taken
in the context of the modern regulatory State, such as strangulating taxation or other
“regulatory takings”.131 While it is not settled how to draw a distinction between
compensable indirect expropriation and non-compensable regulation,132 the emerging
arbitral jurisprudence tends to view unreasonable destruction of the value of foreign
investment, interferences with the management of a company or the repudiation of an
investor-State contract as compensable indirect expropriation. Similarly, the cancellation
and the non-prolongation of operating licenses have been classified as indirect
expropriations by investment tribunals.133
Both direct and indirect expropriations are only lawful under China’s BITs if they
fulfil a public purpose, are implemented in a non-discriminatory manner and observe due
129
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process of law. Some of China’s BITs expressly state that this includes the possibility of
judicial review in national courts concerning the legality of an expropriatory measure.134
Finally and most importantly, both direct and indirect expropriations require
compensation.135
b)

The Amount of Compensation

With regard to the amount of compensation, China’s BITs regularly often do not
endorse an express standard. Above all, they do not incorporate the Hull formula of
“prompt, adequate and effective compensation” which is traditionally demanded as the
standard of compensation under international law by developed countries.136 Instead,
most of the PRC’s BITs simply refer to “compensation” or further classify the standard
with notions like “reasonable” or “appropriate”.137
China’s new generation investment treaties, by contrast, address the standard of
compensation more clearly. The recent Sino-German BIT, for example, requires that the
“compensation shall be equivalent to the value of the investment immediately before the
expropriation is taken or the threatening expropriation has become publicly known”; it
also stipulates that “[t]he compensation shall be paid without delay and shall carry interest
at the prevailing commercial rate until the time of payment; it shall be effectively
realizable and freely transferable”.138 Whether this wording refers to full market value is,
however, still debatable. In practice, calculating the amount of compensation on the basis
of market value may also constitute difficulties, because the Chinese economy has not yet
developed full-fledged market mechanisms. Yet, the PRC seems to be willing to conform
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to the standard of compensation included in general BIT practice, i. e. compensation
based on fair market value according to the Hull formula.139
6.

Umbrella Clause

Violations of national treatment, fair and equitable treatment and direct and
indirect expropriation primarily protect against interferences by governmental power.140
Yet, many foreign investment projects, in particular large-scale infrastructure projects,
such as the construction and operation of a power plant or a highway, are conducted on
the basis of investor-State contracts with the central or regional government or with
specific state agencies or state enterprises. In such cases, the investor may not only be
concerned with interferences by the government as a regulator, but face the unwillingness
of his contracting partner to live up to its contractual obligations. The conduct of the host
State in such cases is often neither expropriatory nor a violation of fair and equitable
treatment, but may simply consist in not paying the contractually due price. These
“simple” violations of contract usually do not amount to expropriation or a violation of
fair and equitable treatment, because the element of exercising public authority is
missing.141
Protection against purely commercial breaches may be accorded by so-called
umbrella clauses that stipulate that “[e]ach Contracting Party shall observe any other
obligation it has entered into with regard to investments in its territory by investors of the
other Contracting Party.”142. While the PRC has initially been reluctant to incorporate
such clauses into her investment treaties, they are increasingly often included in the new
generation treaties.143
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Provided that the contract qualifies as an investment within the meaning of the
applicable BIT, these clauses have the effect that the breach of an investor-State contract
also constitutes a violation of the applicable BIT. This allows the foreign investor to avail
itself of the dispute settlement mechanism under the investment treaty for breaches of
investor-State contracts.144
An interesting question is whether the umbrella clause would allow a foreign
investor to sue its Chinese partner in a Joint Venture Agreement, often a State-owned
enterprise,145 under a bilateral investment treaty, instead of initiating arbitration under the
contractual arbitration clause. The main argument for such an application of the umbrella
clause is that the State is responsible under international law for the conduct of its subentities, including State-owned enterprises if they are exercising public authority.146 In
view of the lack of a clear-cut distinction between private economic activity and State
economy, one could argue that the breaches of contracts by State enterprises always
These clauses, such as Art. 10 of the Sino-Peruvian BIT, stipulate: “If the treatment to be accorded by one
Contracting Party in accordance with its laws and regulations to investment or activities associated with such
investments of investors of the other Contracting Party is more favorable than the treatment provided for in this
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constitute the exercise of public authority and are thus attributable to the PRC under
international law. For the investor, it would carry significant benefits to rely on
international investment arbitration with its enhanced enforcement mechanism,147 instead
of having to deal with the challenges of conducting commercial arbitration in the PRC.148
7.

Capital Transfer Provisions

Capital transfer provisions complement the protection of foreign investment by
ensuring that the host State does not restrict an investor in repatriating his profits. Free
capital transfer collides, however, with the PRC’s traditionally strict foreign exchange and
currency control policies that aim at shielding her State-planned economy and its currency
against uncontrolled foreign exchange flows. Such a system would not have been
compatible with the free transfer provisions that are usually included in international
investment treaties. In consequence, capital transfer provisions in China’s old generation
BITs have always been limited in order to uphold foreign exchange control. This was
done either by clauses subjecting capital transfer to domestic laws and regulations such as
the 1984 Sino-Finnish BIT that provides that “[e]ach Contracting Party shall, subject to its
laws and regulations, allow without undue delay […] to transfer freely in a convertible
currency […] profits, capital gains, dividends [etc.]”149 or by inserting a clause in the BIT
or its protocol that explicitly ensured China’s right to implement its foreign exchange
control. This second approach was chosen, for instance, in the Sino-British BIT that
provides: “In respect of the People’s Republic of China, transfers of convertible currency
by a national […] of the United Kingdom […] shall be made from the foreign exchange
account of the national […] transferring the currency”.150
New grounds concerning transfer and repatriation of capital are broken again by
China’s new generation BITs, such as the 2003 Sino-German BIT. Achieving a further
liberalization of China’s currency transfer policy, the treaty itself now contains unlimited
capital transfer provisions in a freely convertible currency for
“(a) the principal and additional amounts to maintain or increase the
investment; (b) returns; (c) proceeds obtained from the total or partial sale or
liquidation of investments or amounts obtained from the reduction of
147
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investment capital; (d) payments pursuant to a loan agreement in
connection with investments; (e) payments in connection with contracting
projects; (f) earnings of nationals of the other Contracting Party who work
in connection with an investment in its territory”.151
The free capital transfer under the Sino-German BIT is only restricted by
provisions in the Supplemental Protocol. Similar to the “grandfather-clause” on national
treatment, the protocol allows China to keep its current foreign exchange system in place,
but also envisages an abandonment of existing restrictions.152 Likewise, the introduction
of new measures restricting capital transfers is not permissible. The Sino-German BIT
also obliges China’s foreign exchange administration to handle requests for capital
transfers within a maximum period of two months,153 which, compared to the six-month
period in the older Sino-German BIT, is a considerable improvement.154 Again, investors
from other home countries are able to rely on these more favorable investment provisions
owing to MFN treatment.
8.

Miscellaneous Provisions

Apart from these core investors’ rights, Chinese BITs often include a number of
additional miscellaneous provisions that relate to ancillary aspects of foreign investment
projects. By way of example, the 2003 Sino-German BIT contains a specific provisions
prohibiting “arbitrary or discriminatory measures against the management, maintenance,
use, enjoyment and disposal of the investments”.155 Furthermore, it requires “sympathetic
consideration to applications for obtaining visas and working permits to nationals of the
other Contracting Party engaging in activities associated with investments”156 and contains
specific provisions for national and MFN treatment for the compensation of measures
“owing to war or other armed conflict, revolution, a State of national emergency”.157
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IV.

Conclusion

The preceding survey showed that the PRC’s bilateral investment treaties have
slowly evolved since the country signed its first BIT with Sweden in 1982. Initially
reluctant to include national treatment and comprehensive investor-State dispute
settlement, over time China changed its attitude with respect to the protection of foreign
investment by international law and adapted its BIT program to the level of investment
protection that prevails in international practice. This development culminated in the
conclusion of new generation investment treaties with traditional capital-exporting
countries, like Germany and the Netherlands, and with various developing countries.
These treaties conform in all major aspects to international standards.
China’s new generation investment treaties do not only endorse a broader standard
of national treatment, but most importantly contain advance consent to investor-State
arbitration under ICSID rules that allow foreign investors to bring claims for the alleged
violation of all investor’s rights granted in Chinese BITs, such as direct and indirect
expropriation, fair and equitable treatment, full protection and security, free capital
transfer and the observance of commitments under umbrella clauses. This fundamental
change in the PRC’s investment treaty practice should, therefore, further strengthen the
confidence of foreign investors’ in China’s general policy to create a safe and reliable
investment climate that is based on notions of stability, reliability and predictability and
protects foreign investors against undue government interferences. This change in China’s
BIT practice reflects a fundamental change in the country’s attitude towards the protection
of foreign investment by international law. It suggests that the PRC has come to terms
with the widely accepted standards in this field of international law and actively seeks
integration into the international community.
More generally, China’s new generation BITs can also be viewed as an important
indicator for the evaluation of the standard protections contained in international
investment treaties by a developing country. The fact that the PRC deliberately gave up
earlier reservations vis-à-vis some standards of international investment protection
supports the conclusion that the recently accepted BITs reflect an overall beneficial tradeoff between attracting foreign investment and the competing interest of upholding state
sovereignty and regulatory leeway to the greatest possible extent. The content of China’s
new generation BITs should thus serve as a strong counterargument against criticism of
international investment law as the outcome of hegemonic domination of capital-
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exporting countries over capital-importing countries.158 This is particularly true, since
China disposes of sufficient negotiating power, even vis-à-vis capital-exporting countries,
in order to decline the acceptance of certain standards, as has been done in the past above
all in respect of investor-State dispute settlement provisions. Instead, the content of her
new generation BITs with traditional capital-exporting countries like Germany or the
Netherlands constitute the product of arms-length negotiation that resulted in China’s
deliberate choice to include broader rights for foreign investors.159 In view of this
deliberate choice, it is thus not convincing to argue that the content of international
standards on investment protection generally overemphasizes the interests of foreign
investors over the interests and concerns of host States.160 China’s change in BIT practice
and its acceptance of international standards of investment protection rather suggest that
the restrictions of its sovereignty over foreign investment represent a beneficial bargain in
view of attracting further foreign investment.
In view of China’s increasing importance as a capital-exporter, one might argue
that her new BIT practice may primarily be prompted by its interests in protecting its own
investors abroad. The change in treaty practice might thus be the result of hegemonic
behavior of China vis-à-vis other developing countries. Yet, China’s overall stakes as a
capital-exporting country are still relatively small compared to its inward foreign
investment. In addition, even if China is pressing for more comprehensive investment
protection in its new generation BITs in view of its rising stakes in future outward foreign
investment, the country is an even better example for a State that is in a position to have
significant interest in both inward and outward foreign investments. This dual role of a
158
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capital-importing as well as a capital-exporting country would arguably lead to a
particularly balanced outcome in the negotiation of international investment agreements
because China has to find a trade-off between her interests as a capital-exporting country
that is interested in a broad range of investment protection for her investors abroad while,
in view of inward foreign investment, she is interested in upholding state sovereignty and
regulatory leeway as far as possible. This role will prompt a position that results in a
balance between her interests as a capital-exporting country, on the one hand, and as a
capital-importing, on the other, and will thus not favor either interest.161 The fact that
China’s new generation BITs are not more advantageous to Chinese investors abroad
compared to the standard of protection for investor from States like Germany or the
Netherlands thus indicates that the PRC also considers the international standard of
investment protection as an appropriate level for the protection of its own investments
abroad. The growing convergence of investment treaty practice towards accepting
international standards in BIT protection therefore has to be taken as an indicator that
BITs strike an appropriate balance between the protection of foreign investment and state
sovereignty more generally.
Finally, the regime set up by the new generation BITs does not only benefit foreign
investors in the PRC but should affect China’s domestic institutions and the procedures
they apply in broader terms because BITs exercise significant influences on the
development of the domestic legal and economic structures in the host State. The specific
guarantees contained in the treaties aim at implementing structures that are essential for
the functioning of a market economy. National and most-favored-nation treatment aim at
ensuring a level playing field for the economic activity of foreign and domestic economic
actors and are a prerequisite for competition. The protection against expropriation
guarantees the respect for property rights as an essential institution for market
transactions; capital transfer guarantees ensure the free flow of capital and contribute to
the efficient allocation of resources in a global market. The umbrella clause backs up
private ordering between foreign investors and the home State. Fair and equitable
treatment and full protection and security ensure basic due process rights for foreign
investors and require adequate police protection, features that are equally essential for the
161
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functioning of market economies. Finally, the possibility to have recourse to international
arbitration represents a mechanism that allows foreign investors to enforce China’s
compliance with her BIT obligations.
The content of investment treaties should thus support legal reform developments
in the PRC by establishing good governance standards as a reference for legislative,
administrative and judicial conduct.162
Especially, concerning the conduct of
administrative agencies and the deployment of judicial proceedings, investment treaties
support the establishment of procedures, practices and rules that conform to rule of law
standards and are conducive for sustainable development and economic growth. Above
all, the fair and equitable treatment standard is predestined to influence the law on
domestic administrative procedures163 as well as procedures applied by domestic courts.164
Ultimately, even the national legislator may be restricted in implementing its policies by
the regime set up by international investment treaties.165
Even though the scope of BITs is restricted to foreign investors, the substantive
rights and guarantees they contain are likely to have spill-over effects on the domestic legal
system. BITs will thus not only influence the situation of foreign investors in China and
the treatment they can expect, but also create an incentive for the PRC to promote liberal
values on a broader basis by letting domestic economic actors benefit from the overall
changes in the economic and legal system. Although nationals cannot rely on the
substantive provisions contained in BITs, it is probable, for example, that the forms and
procedures of government conduct required vis-à-vis foreign investors will increasingly be
applied with respect to domestic actors. The main reason for this is that the
implementation of parallel systems for local and foreign investors will be more costly than
a uniform system. Similar to obligations incurred under WTO law, bilateral investment
treaties should therefore continuously lead to giving up the distinction between foreign
and national economic actors in Chinese law and help to support the transgression of the
Chinese economy into a full-fledged market economy and its integration into the global
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economy. Conforming to the framework set up by international investment agreements is
thus another step to improve the investment climate in the PRC.166
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